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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University. The aim of this thesis is to present a comprehensive analysis of the 
phenomenon of hostile takeovers and the basic defense strategies that can be adopted 
against them.  
 
First a reference has been made to the theoretical background of the scheme of 
takeovers in general, for the best understanding of the terminology which is various in 
this field. Then, hostile takeovers are presented and in this stage it was crucial a 
division among the preliminary takeover steps and the main takeover tactics. 
 
The second part of this thesis is about the defence strategies that can be adopted 
against hostile takeovers and case law references are used as paradigms. Defence 
strategies are also divided in proactive and active defence measures. In general, the 
target of this study is to give prominence to the most famous defence strategies and to 
point out when these are chosen as a tactic by the acquired company. 
 
Last part of this thesis refers to the European framework for the hostile takeovers 
which refers to the EU Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC and its basic 
articles. In this part, the thesis focuses on proposals for achieving the initial goal of the 
Directive, the creation of a unified European system on the field of takeover bids. 
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Introduction 
The corporation’s legal personhood is a fiction which creates and guarantees many 
powers and rights for the corporations. Among these powers, corporations have the 
right to hold, acquire and dispose of stock of other corporations, through a merger or 
other acquisition device. Moreover, corporations can also be acquired by natural 
persons and other entities, but the vast majority of corporate takeovers are affected 
by other corporations. 1 The rationale for corporate takeovers is traditionally couched 
in terms of maximizing stock- holder wealth and that firms will make acquisitions only 
if they believe it will enhance stock prices.2 In addition, it seems that the quickest way 
for a corporation to increase its size or diversify into unrelated activities is to make 
major corporate acquisitions and for that reason management boards sometimes 
pursue takeover and merger activities even if stockholders suffer reduced returns 
(Reich, 1983).3In practice, mergers and acquisitions seem to be the new-age way for a 
corporation to expand and become transnational. One kind of corporate acquisitions is 
the takeovers, which can be divided in two categories: the friendly and the hostile. 
Friendly takeovers are those where the target company is approached by the intending 
acquirer with a bid and they both discuss and negotiate for the forthcoming 
acquisition. The target company may agree or not, to sell its stake to the acquirer.4 
Sometimes, when the acquisition is negotiated, the target is willing to be bought and 
may even have initiated the acquisition by searching itself the buyer.5 Through a 
friendly takeover, matters may arise such as which will be the process by which the 
acquisition will take place, which will be the duties of management and how much is 
the risk of the competing bidders. 6 Nevertheless, since the terms of the takeovers are 
all negotiable, those matters can be solved with cooperation among the acquirer and 
the target corporation.  
                                                 
1 Bainbridge M. Stephen, (2009).  Mergers and Acquisitions in Corporate Law, 2nd edition, Concept and Insight 
Series, Foundation Press, p. 337 
2 Firth Michael, (1991), “Corporate Takeovers, Stock holder Returns and Executive Rewards”, University of 
Colorado, USA, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 12, 421-428  
3
 Ibid 
4 Knight/Rider Tribune News Service, (2006), “Any idea about hostile takeovers?”  The Economic Times, section 
Business and Financial News, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com 
5
 See below: White Knight defence strategy 
6 Bainbridge M. Stephen (2009) Mergers and Acquisitions in Corporate Law, 2nd edition, Concept and Insight Series, 
Foundation Press, p. 337  
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On the other hand, a ‘hostile takeover’ is the acquisition of one company, which is 
called the target company by another one, who is known as the acquirer. The term is 
also defined as when a company puts a bid on a target firm, which is being opposed by 
the management of the targeted company which furthermore advises its shareholders 
not to sell to the acquiring firm (Savela, 1999).7 Does this phenomenon of hostile 
takeovers exist or is it just a theoretical structure? In fact, the past 30 to 40 years, in 
the US and the UK, there has been a growing culture of hostile bids. 8 In this point, a 
terminology analysis is crucial, since the field of Mergers and Acquisitions is vast and 
complicated. 
 
THEORITICAL ANALYSIS OF A TAKEOVER 
 
Since many different terms are used in the field of mergers and acquisitions it is 
advisable to define the framework in which hostile takeovers are integrated. For this 
scope, the most crucial takeover definitions are above analyzed. 
 
TAKEOVER DEFINITIONS 
In general, an acquisition is also known as a takeover and the meaning of both is the 
buying of one company (the target) by another company. As already mentioned an 
acquisition may have a friendly and negotiated character or may be hostile and based 
on a strategic plan in order to be accomplished. The most usual meaning of an 
acquisition is the purchase of a smaller company by a larger and more dynamic one. 
 In a few lines, a takeover may be defined as a transaction or series of transactions 
whereby a natural or legal person or group of persons acquires control over the assets 
of a company, either directly by becoming the owner of those assets or indirectly by 
obtaining control of the management of the company.9 There is also the phenomenon, 
where the smaller company acquires management control of a big one and the 
                                                 
7 Investopedia,( 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ 
8 Bell Emily, (1999), Business focus: The Mannesmann Battle: Vulture versus old culture; Emily Bell asks if 
Germany is out of step on hostile takeovers. The Observer Business, pg. 4 
9 Papadopoulos, Thomas, (2008) The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC (2008). 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 13-103 
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combined entity retains the name of the initial small company. This kind of acquisition 
is known as a reverse takeover.10 
Furthermore, a merger is an amalgamation between companies of similar size in which 
either the members of the merging companies exchange their shares for other shares 
in a new company or the members of some of the merging companies exchange their 
shares for shares in another merging company. The basic distinction between a 
takeover and a merger is that in a takeover the control of the assets of the acquired 
company passes to the acquirer while in a merger, the shareholding in the merged 
company is spread among the shareholders of the two initial companies. 11 
Also known type of acquisition is the reverse merger, through which a private company 
buys a publicly listed shell company and this is a way of going public without the 
expenses and time required by an IPO (initial public offering). 12 In a few words, an 
initial public offering is the first time that the stock of a private company is offered to 
the public and as a process with many stages, demands also many costs. 13  
 
TAKEOVER MOTIVATIONS AND MECHANICS 
 
Motivations for a corporation to take over another corporation might be to expand 
product breadth, a geographic scope or a customer base. Moreover, maybe the 
corporation tends to expand horizontally or vertically14, diversify into different product 
markets, pursue unvalued resources or manipulate financial indicators such as risk 
profiles. More or less, a hostile takeover represents a battle for corporate control and 
most commonly it evolves an outside entity, usually a corporation, which attempts to 
approach the shareholders of the target firm, through different mechanisms. 15 
 
                                                 
10 Papadopoulos, Thomas, (2008) The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC (2008). 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 13-103  
11 Ibid 
12 Giddy Ian, (2009), „Mergers & Acquisitions: Definitions and Motivations‟, NYU STERN 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/articles/mergers_and_acquisitions.html> accessed 7 December 2017.   
13 Investopedia, (2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ 
14
 “Horizontal integration is the act of integrating other infrastructures, assets and companies of the same industry or 
in the same level o production. Vertical integration is the act of expanding into new operations for the purpose of 
decreasing a firm‟s reliability on other firms in the process of production and distribution.” Analysis by Kimmons 
Ronald, (2018),“What Are the Differences Between Vertical & Horizontal in Strategic Management?”in 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/differences-between-vertical-horizontal-strategic-management-24460.html 
15 Pearce John A. and  Robinson Richard B.,2004, Article in “Hostile takeover defences that maximize shareholder 
wealth”, Business Horizons 47/5 
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A HOSTILE TAKEOVER 
 
For the scope of this part of the thesis, a comparison among hostile takeovers and 
friendly takeovers is crucial. First, a friendly takeover has the advantages of being a 
less costly process and also minimizes the loss of key persons, customers and suppliers 
which may arise during the hostile takeover and the fight for the control of the 
target.16 If the raider chooses a friendly takeover attempt, he makes a “take it or leave 
it” offer for the whole company and in this case, if the board agrees to the proposed 
merger, the shareholders vote on whether or not to accept the offer. 17  
In the hostile takeovers, where the target doesn’t accept the friendly approach of the 
bidder, the acquirer has to either abandon its effort or resort to more aggressive 
tactics. These tactics, at a glance, seem to be less effective, due to extra time and 
money which is wasted, since the target company activates defense strategies in order 
to avoid the hostile acquisition.18  
In general, in a hostile takeover, the management of the target company does not 
agree with the acquisition of the company and objects to it. The acquiring company 
fulfills a strategic plan in order to achieve the acquisition. In practice, a hostile 
takeover can be accomplished through two main tactics: a tender offer and a proxy 
fight. Each tactic has its pros and cons, which are going to be analyzed. 
 The first tactic, a tender offer, is a resort for the acquiring company when the friendly 
negotiation does not appear to be effective. Through a tender offer, the bidder may 
have the opportunity to circumvent the target’s management board and obtain the 
control. The second tactic, a proxy fight, is an attempt by the shareholders to take the 
control of the company through the use of the proxy mechanism of corporate voting19 
Before those main tactics, the part of preparation of a hostile takeover consists of 
preliminary steps, which most of the times end up to a main tactic.  
 
                                                 
16 DePamphilis M. Donald, (2009), The Corporate Takeover Market in Mergers, Acquisitions and Other 
Restructuring Activities, An integrated Approach to Process, Tools, Cases and Solutions, fifth Edition, pg 102 
17 Schnitzer Monika,( Feb 1996), Hostile versus Friendly Takeovers, Economica, New Series, Wiley on behalf of The 
London School of Economics and Political Science and The Suntory and Toyota International Centres of Economics 
and Related Disciplines, Vol. 63, No 249 ,pp. 37-55 
18 DePamphilis M. Donald, (2009), The Corporate Takeover Market in Mergers, Acquisitions and Other 
Restructuring Activities, An integrated Approach to Process, Tools, Cases and Solutions, fifth Edition, pg 102 
19 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Takeover Tactics in Mergers, Acquisitions, And Corporate Restructurings, fifth 
edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, p.p. 243-271 
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PRELIMINARY TAKEOVERS STEPS 
 
Preliminary takeover steps are the first part of a hostile strategy and their role in the 
takeover is that they create the right conditions for a successful acquisition of the 
target. An analysis of the main preliminary steps is crucial in this stage, since those 
constitute the preparation for a successful takeover. 
 
ESTABLISHING A TOEHOLD 
 
Establishing a toehold is one famous preliminary takeover step according to which         
a hostile bidder begins an accumulation of the target’s company shares. In this way, 
the bidder seeks to establish a toehold from which to launch its hostile bid. A serious 
advantage of establishing a toehold is that the bidder may be able to avoid the 
payment of a premium, if the market is unaware of its actions. In addition, the bidder 
may gain some of the same rights that other shareholders of the target company have. 
20It is surprising that, despite their theoretical benefits, toehold strategies are not 
really common and as B. Espen Eckbo, a senior business professor at Dartmouth, 
pointed out: “not only the toehold play is less frequently executed, but in recent years 
they have rarely proven successful.” 21  
This accumulation might be spotted through an early warning system, which is a 
defense measure that controls the mobility of the target’s shares, for the scope of 
being aware that a bidder is preparing for a hostile takeover. It seems that establishing 
a toehold is difficult to be successful, since nowadays most of the corporations have 
adopted such defence measures. 
                                                 
20 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, Establishing a Toehold in Mergers, Acquisitions, And 
Corporate Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 245 
21 Marino Jonathan, (2009), Wither the Toehold; even with share prices down, few buyers look to accumulate a stake 
ahead of a deal. Mergers & Acquisitions, The Dealmaker’s Journal , pg. 14  
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BIDDING STRATEGIES 
 
Planning bidding strategies is also a crucial preliminary takeover step. In general, a 
takeover bid is a type of corporate action through which an acquiring company 
makes an offer to the target company’s shareholders to buy the target’s company 
shares and gain the control of the business. Some kinds of takeovers bids are:  
1) Two-Tier Bids: The acquiring company offers to pay a premium which exceeds the 
share’s price in order to convince shareholders to accept the bid. 
2) Any-and-All Bid: The acquiring company offers to buy outstanding shares of the 
company, means shares which refer to the company’ s stock currently held by all its 
shareholders, at a specific price.22 
When creating a bidding strategy, the bidder has to consider the responses of not 
just the target company but also the other bidders. A key for the initial bidder is to 
prepare and structure is initial bid in this way, so that it will preempt the other 
bidders and avoid overpaying. This can be defined as the optimal bid.23  
As the evidence shows, the target company may force the bidder to raise the offer 
price, reject all offers by the initial bidder in favor of a rival end even reject all 
bidders. In sum, initiating a bidding strategy is a risk that the acquiring company 
takes.24 In this stage, I believe it is crucial for the bidder to evaluate the financial data 
and weigh the situation. If the offer price is extremely raised and the result of the 
takeover won’t be the desirable for the bidder, then the whole acquisition won’t be 
advantageous and the right move should be to withdraw the offer. A well 
established bidding strategy should present from the start, the point in which the 
best for the bidder is to totally recede from the takeover. 
In a few lines, pre bid planning should involve a review on the target’s defences, an 
assessment of these defenses that may be activated after the bid is made and the 
size of the float associated with the target’s stock. Poor planning may results to a 
poor and unsuccessful bidding strategy. 25 
                                                 
22 Investopedia,( 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ 
23 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, Establishing a Toehold in Mergers, Acquisitions, And 
Corporate Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 246 
24  Eckbo B. Espen, (2008), Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A Review, Tuck School of Business at 
Dartmouth, Working Paper No. 2008-48, forthcoming Journal of Corporate Finance 
25 DePamphilis M. Donald, (2009), The Corporate Takeover Market in Mergers, Acquisitions and Other 
Restructuring Activities, An integrated Approach to Process, Tools, Cases and Solutions, fifth Edition, pg 102 
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CASUAL PASS 
 
As a preliminary takeover tactic, a casual pass, is an informal attempt to approach 
the management of the target, before initiating the takeover process. It may start 
from the bidder’s management or from its representatives. A casual pass may be 
used if the bidder feels unsure of the targets’ response but it may also act against 
the bidder since it provides the target of information and notifies for the bidder’s 
interest. The bidder usually initiates contact casually through an intermediary, such 
as its investment banker.  26   
Through this tactic, the bidder has the opportunity to elicit clues from the target’s 
management and be prepared for the outcome of the acquisition. As mentioned, 
there is always the risk that the target will be prepared for the takeover and may 
even activate its defences, before the initiation of the takeover. In any case, the right 
move for the bidder should be to approach the management, without revealing all 
its hostile weapons. 
 
BEAR HUG 
 
A bear hug is a preliminary takeover step according to which the acquirer 
corporation makes a very generous offer to buy the target’s shares for a much higher 
per- share price that what the target is worth. The name of this tactic reveals the 
persuasiveness of the offer.27  
Bear-hugs are driven by the bidder’s desire for the target co- operation, particularly 
those bidders most of the times wish to use a scheme of arrangement or need to 
gain access to due diligence before committing to a deal. Moreover, the tactic is 
used when the bidder suspects that its offer won’t be welcomed with open arms by 
the target and uses the bear hug for the scope of bringing the proposal to the 
attention of target shareholders, in the hope that the shareholders will pressure the 
board to negotiate with the bidder. 28 
                                                 
26 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, Establishing a Toehold in Mergers, Acquisitions, And 
Corporate Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 246 
27 Investopedia, (2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ 
28 Karen Evans- Kullen, (2012), “Will the bear hug replace the hostile takeover?”, 
https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2012/march/will-the-bear-hug-replace-the-hostile-takeover 
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Since, the target’s company management is legally obligated to support its 
shareholders interests; this extra generous offer forces the management to accept of 
being acquired. In case of refusing the offer, the shareholders of the company may 
file a lawsuit if this refusal is not well stated and justified. 29  
Due to the very generous character of the “bear hug” as a tactic, we could say that a 
bear hug is a kind of a friendly approach of a takeover and not a preliminary step for 
a hostile one, since the bidder scopes to negotiate with the target and through its 
offer the target will earn serious profit. 
 
Microsoft’s Bear Hug Bid for Yahoo 
A very famous bear hug case was the Microsoft’s bear hug bid for Yahoo. In 2009, 
Microsoft announced its interest to acquire Yahoo through a bear hug and offered 
$44.6 billion for the takeover. Microsoft tried to level up the pressure by stating that 
if its offer wouldn’t be accepted, they would try to use a proxy fight.30 Microsoft 
hoped that the bear hug would puss institutional investors to press the board for 
accepting the attractive offer. Due to that pressure, Yahoo’s chief executive officer 
(CEO) had to step aside and the companies entered into an agreement. Microsoft 
didn’t manage to takeover Yahoo but achieved to create an Internet search 
partnership with Yahoo’s search engine and the deal also brought advertising 
revenue to Yahoo.31 
 
MAIN TAKEOVER TACTICS 
 
If the takeover of the target wasn’t successful, after the preliminary takeover steps, 
the bidder proceeds to the next step and implements a hostile strategy for pursuing 
the acquisition. As above analyzed, the main tactics for a hostile takeover are the 
tender offers and the proxy fights. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Investopedia, (2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ 
30 See below: Main takeover tactics 
31 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, Bear Hugs in Mergers, Acquisitions, And Corporate 
Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 249 
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TENDER OFFERS 
 
A tender offer is the technique of acquiring control of a corporation by making a 
public offer to purchase a part of the corporations’ stock at a fixed price. Tender 
offers had been widely used in the United States in recent years and are regulated by 
the Williams Act (USA) which refers to 1968 amendments to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.32 In fact, in 1965 there were twenty-nine cash tender offers to acquire 
control involving companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and fifteen 
involving companies listed on the American Stock Exchange.33 
Moreover, the Williams Act was passed to protect shareholders in the course of 
takeovers and tender offers, through granting the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the courts the power to manage problems that may arise. 
Despite its scope, the Act did not define what constitutes a “tender offer” and it has, 
been left to the courts to formulate an exact definition.34 Therefore, in a famous 
case, Wellman v. Dickinson35, the court set forth the Eight Factor Test, regarding the 
definition of a tender offer. The eight factors were suggested by the SEC to 
determine in which cases a purchase constitutes a tender offer· the so- called 
“Wellman test”. These factors are the following and not all need to be present in 
each transaction: 
1) Active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders; 
2) Solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the target’s stock; 
3) Offer is at a premium to the prevailing market price; 
4) Terms are fixed rather than negotiable; 
5) Offer contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of shares to be 
purchased; 
6) Offer is only open for a limited period of time; 
7) Offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their stock; and 
                                                 
32 According to Wikipedia, The Williams Act amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the scope of 
requiring mandatory disclosure of information regarding cash tender offers. 
33 Fleiscer Arthur, Jr. And Mundheim Robert H., (1967), “Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer”, University of 
Pensylvania Law Review, Vol 115, pp. 317-370 
34 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, Tender Offers in Mergers, Acquisitions, And 
Corporate Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 250  
35  See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. (SD NY 1979), aff‟d632 F.2d 355 (CA2 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1069 (1983) 
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8) Public announcements of a purchase program for the target's 
securities precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts 
of the target's securities.36 
 
The “Totality of the Circumstances Test” 
Moreover, except for the tender offer rules, other courts for defining a transaction 
as a tender offer, focus also on whether there is a likelihood that there will be a 
substantial risk that persons solicited will lack the needed information in order to 
make a careful valuation of the bidder’s proposal. 37 
 
In practice, a tender offer as a hostile strategy has its pros and cons. For start, as a 
technique is simple in its business and legal mechanics. Moreover, it is a cheap tactic 
since the major expense is the price of the shares bought and this purchase price is a 
reasonable investment, in the framework of a takeover. Even if the bid fails, the 
acquirer may be able to sale any shares acquired in the open market and gain a 
profit.38 
 Instead, the use of a tender offer has its costs also. For instance, the company 
making the offer doesn’t have the opportunity to make a detailed investigation 
related to this specific transaction. Moreover, the offeror doesn’t have the 
protection of the representations and warranties which are made through the 
agreement of a merger or for sale of assets. Also, the acquiring company frequently 
pays more for each share of stock in the block it acquires than it would pay for each 
share, if it would acquire all the shares of the target.39 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Bowerman Freed  Amy and Johnson Alexander B., (2007), Tender Offers, Securities Law for Non-Securities 
Lawyers 
http://files.alicle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/30FreedTenderOffersCH001_thumb.pdf 
37See  Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986) 
(citing Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
38
 Fleiscer Arthur, Jr. And  Mundheim Robert H., (1967), “Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer”, University of 
Pensylvania Law Review, Vol 115, pp. 317-370 
39
 Ibid 
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PROXY FIGHTS 
 
A proxy fight as a main takeover strategy is an attempt by a single shareholder or a 
group of them to take control of a target company or bring changes, through the use 
of the proxy mechanism of corporate voting.40 Proxy fights were fashionable in USA 
for takeovers in the 1990’s and the main reason for this is that tough state anti-
takeover laws lead to a proxy strategy. Pennsylvania, for instance, was close to pass 
legislation that would make hostile takeovers almost impossible to achieve.41  
Since a proxy fight is a very complicated process, it is easier to be understood if it is 
broken down into discrete steps: 
1) Starting the Proxy Fight: A bidder, who is also a stockholder, attempts to change 
control of the target company, at the shareholder’s annual meeting. 
2) The Solicitation Process: Before the stockholder’s meeting, the insurgent group of 
stockholders contacts with other stockholders of the company and tries to convince 
them to vote against management’s candidates for the board of directors or to vote 
for an acquisition or against certain antitakeover amendments. This contact is 
usually handled by a proxy solicitor who represents the insurgent group of 
stockholders. On the other hand, the management board may hire a proxy firm as a 
representative and a proxy contest begins, during which the stockholders are 
repeatedly called to be convinced, by the proxies, to stand with their client’s 
position.42 
3) The corporate voting process: After receiving the proxies’ pressure, stockholders 
may then forward their votes to a designated collector and the votes are sent to the 
proxy clerks at the brokerage firms, to tabulate them The brokerage firm, submits 
the vote results before the company’s meeting and during the tabulation process, 
voting inspectors and proxy solicitors supervise end ensure their clients’ interests.43 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Shea Edward, (New York:1999),  The McGraw- Hill Guide to Acquiring and Divesting Businesses, pgs 335-336 
41 Regurly Eric, (April 3, 1990), “Proxy fight fashionable for takeovers”, The Financial Post (Toronto, Canada), 
Daily Edition, section 1, News, pg 3, Inside New York 
42 Shea Edward, (New York:1999),  The McGraw- Hill Guide to Acquiring and Divesting Businesses, pgs 335-336 
43 Gaughan A. Patrick,( 2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, PROXY FIGHTS in Mergers, Acquisitions, And 
Corporate Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pgs 271-281 
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Microsoft and Yahoo proxy battle 
A very well-known proxy battle was held among Microsoft and Yahoo, since 
Microsoft threatened to launch a hostile bid for Yahoo if the board didn’t reconsider 
the software giant’s Jan. 31 offer of $44.6 billion in cash and stock. This proxy battle 
was similar to one that Carl Icahn dropped against Motorola Inc. in exchange for the 
company’ s support of two of his nominees for the board of directors.44 
 
HP and Compaq proxy battle 
“The most famous case of proxy fight was Hewlett-Packard’s takeover of Compaq. 
The deal was valued at 25$ billion. But Hewlett- Packard reportedly spent huge sums 
on advertising to sway shareholders. HP wasn’t fighting Compaq- they were fighting 
a group of investors that included founding members of the company who oppose 
the merge. About 51 percent of shareholders voted in favor of the merger. Despite 
attempts to halt the deal on legal grounds, it went as planned.” 45 Through case law 
we can understand in a better way what a hostile takeover is and how a defensive 
method works. In this specific case, HP wanted to achieve the takeover and used as a 
weapon the advertising, in order to make the shareholders more vulnerable, to 
accept the merger. 
 
Despite the fact that proxy fights have their sponsors which believe that the main 
advantages to a proxy fight are speed and low overall cost, other find problems in 
this process such as: 
1) Many companies have already set up defenses against proxy-fight takeovers. The 
most popular defense is to give directors staggered terms46 and if only a minority of 
directors come up for re-election each year, it could take years to oust the entire 
board. 
2) Proxy fights require risking and substantial out-of-pocket costs and  
                                                 
44 Joseph Alex, (April 9, 2008) “What‟s a “Proxy Battle?, Just what was Microsoft threatening to do to 
Yahoo?”,http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/04/whats_a_proxy_battle.html, 
http://www.slate.com/ 
45 Yadav Ayush, (2011), “Hostile Takeovers and its Defense Tactics”, Institute of Law, Nirma University, 
Ahmedabad, India 
46 See bellow: Defense Strategy of a staggered board 
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3) Even investors who dislike management might not go along with a proxy fight and 
unless there is a large group of disappointed investors holding a stock, many won’t 
follow the bidder and that can make a proxy fight drag on for a long time, as said 
Edward Moore of arbitrage firm Moore Grossman & de Rose.47 
 
When a hostile takeover takes place, leads to a disagreement between the 
shareholders of the target company and its board of directors, who have a negative 
position for this specific bid. When a target faces this situation, the directors are 
obliged to create a defense strategy, in order to protect their position or to ensure 
that the terms of the bid are going to be improved. There are many defense 
strategies and sometimes a combination of more of them becomes a useful tool, for 
reacting to a hostile takeover. Scope of this paper is to examine the most popular of 
them and emphasize on their crucial elements. 
 
DEFENCE STRATEGIES 
 
During the 1980’s, corporate takeovers reached new levels of hostility and by the 
end of the same period, the defensive strategies became very complex and 
sophisticated. Investment banks in cooperation with managements of large 
corporations, started to organize and adopt defence measures for facing the 
aggressive raiders of the fourth merger wave.48  
Due to the fact that takeover bids most of the times offer stockholders a premium 
for their shares, defense strategies are sometimes viewed as barriers to increased 
shareholders wealth. Despite that, among the most common rationales to defend 
against a hostile takeover are: the desire to retain autonomy or management 
control, the preference for a different partner, the belief in a tradition mission that 
would be compromised by new management and last the desire to negotiate a more 
favorable and prosperous takeover. The other perspective argues that executives of 
target firms adopt defensive measures in order to maintain their power positions 
                                                 
47  McComick Jay,( November 7, 1989), “Proxy fights still attract scepticism”, USA TODAY, Final Edition, 
Section: Money; Pg. 1B 
48 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preliminary Takeover Steps, Proxy Fights in Mergers, Acquisitions, And Corporate 
Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 183 
-14- 
 
and compensation levels, while fearing the change of the controlling interests. Due 
to this executive motivation, the management’s actions do not necessarily reflect 
the best interests of stockholders.49 
Furthermore, the first and more crucial steps for creating a defense strategy are: 
being aware of the threat and take prevention measures. Preventative measures 
seem to be an exercise in a wall building. Higher and more resistant walls need to be 
continually designed and installed for the target company in order to face the raiders 
with their investment and legal advisors, who create the hostile strategies.50The 
target companies must count on the risk exists and their management board should 
be informed for all the defensive measures and techniques, in order to avoid losing 
the company’s control and consequently their jobs.  
Moreover, a defence strategy is a combination of different measures, which can be 
divided into proactive or preventive and reactive or active measures. Particularly, 
proactive or preventive measures are used for making companies less attractive 
before the hostile takeover and reactive or active measures are employed after a 
hostile bid has been attempted.51  
 
PROACTIVE MEASURES OF A DEFENCE STRATEGY 
 
Famous proactive measures of a defence strategy are the following: 
 
 An Early Warning System 
 Staggered Board  
 Poison Pill 
 Golden Parachute 
 
 
                                                 
49 Pearce John A.  And Robinson  Richard B.,( 2004), Article in “Hostile takeover defences that maximize 
shareholder wealth”, Business Horizons 47/5 
50 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Antitakeover Measures in Mergers, Acquisitions, And Corporate Restructurings, 
fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 185 
51 Goutham G. Shetty, (2018) “Hostile takeover Defenses-I”,https://www.slideshare.net/mahtuoggs/hostile-
takeover-defenses 
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AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
In the first proactive measure of a defence strategy of having an Early Warning 
System, the target company adopts a system of monitoring the trading of its shares 
(trading patterns), in order to check the distribution of share ownership and 
movements of the shareholders. This is a way for the board to estimate the 
dangerous takeover and take prevention measures afterwards. A sudden and 
unexpected increase in trading level may signal the presence of a hostile bidder to 
accumulate shares before the announcement of its takeover intentions.52  
Through this early warning system, the target has to ability to locate hostile moves 
such as “establishing a toehold” and prepare for the oncoming attack. This system 
should be observed by specialists who have the ability to distinguish the suspicious 
shares mobility and refer to the board, for the scope of adopting a defense strategy. 
 
STAGGERED BOARD 
 
In the second defence proactive measure53, the corporation has a staggered board 
for which the company’s shareholders have to give their approval.54 If they do, the 
board members won’t be elected annually; instead only a group of members will be 
submitted for reelection ever year. Consequently, if the acquiring company aims to 
replace the entire board, by buying shares, in order to gain the control of the 
company, it will need more time and money.55  
In practice, a staggered board makes it very difficult for a hostile bidder to gain 
control over the incumbent’s objections, since it causes serious delay to the whole 
process and even a year in the dynamic corporate world has its meaning. Moreover, 
the costs from this delay are extremely high and managers are provided with 
                                                 
52 Gaughan A. Patrick, (2011), Preventative Antitakeover Measures in Mergers, Acquisitions, And Corporate 
Restructurings, fifth edition, John Wiley&Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, pg 185 
53 Also known as the classified board defense 
54 Goutham G Shetty, (2018)“Hostile takeover Defenses-I”,https://www.slideshare.net/mahtuoggs/hostile-
takeover- 
defenses,  
55 Yang Erik  and Zarin  Samim, (Spring 2011), Bachelor thesis in “Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and 
defense strategies against them”, Department of Business & Administration, International Business, School of 
Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg 
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stronger protection from a hostile takeover56, since its positions in the company are 
much more stable. 
As mentioned above, having a staggered board is the best defence for the hostile 
tactic of a proxy fight, since if only a minority of directors come up for re-election 
each year it could take years for the bidder to change the entire board.57 This delay is 
often associated with extra expenses which can make it more difficult getting finance 
for the acquiring company and due to this the target company becomes less 
attractive. This tactic acts more or less as a threatening or delaying measure since in 
every case the bidder cannot be stopped from acquiring a big block of shares and 
eventually gaining the control of the company. To sum up, the staggered board 
strategy is moderately effective on its own58 and has only a proactive defensive 
character. 
 
 
POISON PILL 
 
A “Poison pill” is a generic term that refers to protection against an unsolicited 
tender offer and as a proactive defensive measure belongs to the contractual 
mechanisms that strengthen a target company.59 In general, the ‘poison pill’ is a 
tactic used by a company that fears an unwanted takeover, through which the target 
ensures that a successful takeover bid will trigger some event that substantially 
reduces the value of the company. Moreover, a poison pill is a rights plan that gives 
the power to existing shareholders to control securities or cash in the case of a 
                                                 
56 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian , (May, 2002) ”The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 5, pp. 887-951  
57 McComick Jay, (November 7, 1989), “Proxy fights still attract scepticism”, USA TODAY, Final Edition, 
Section: Money; Pg. 1B 
 
58 Yang Erik and Zarin Samim , (Spring 2011), Bachelor thesis in “Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and 
defence strategies against them”, Department of Business & Administration, International Business, School of 
Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg 
 
59 Tiwari Rahul, (2008), Working paper on “Merger and Acquisition, Defence Strategies Adopted by Companies “, 
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hostile takeover. In the opposite case, of a friendly bidder who takes control of the 
company, these rights are redeemable at the option of the board.60 
Specifically, poison pills are inactive rights until they are triggered and after their 
implementation they can only be redeemed by the board of directors. These rights 
are triggered when an unwanted shareholder acquires a pre-specified amount of 
stock, which has been agreed by the board of directors61. With a poison pill, the 
target company tries to make its stock less attractive to the acquirer.62  
There are different types of poison pills: the ‘flip-over’ pills and the ‘flip-in’ pills. In a 
flip-over pill plan, the rights become part of the company’s common stock and 
cannot be traded separately. These rights can be separated from the common stock 
and become exercisable only when a prospective acquirer shows up who announces 
or intends to acquire some specified percentage of the issuer’s stock, most of the 
times the twenty percent (trigger level). This is commonly called as the distribution 
event and after this, the issued rights become active and exercisable. The pill’s flip-
over feature is that it is triggered after the acquisition, when the target is merged 
into the acquirer and the holder of each right becomes entitled to purchase common 
stock of the acquiring company, in half price.63 
One serious drawback of this ‘flip-over pill’ is that it is triggered after the acquirer 
has obtained the full ownership of the company. Due to this serious drawback, 
transaction planners developed the other form of poison pills, the flip-in pill. The flip-
in pill is triggered by the actual acquisition of some specified percentage of the 
issuer’s common stock. The key feature is that, when triggered, the flip-in pill entitles 
the holder of the right, except for the acquirer and its affiliates or associates, to buy 
shares of the target’s common stock at half price. The value of the common stock 
                                                 
60 Papadopoulos, Thomas, The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC (2008). 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 13-103, 2008.  
61 Yang  Erik and Zarin Samim , (Spring 2011), Bachelor thesis in “Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and 
defence strategies against them”, Department of Business & Administration, International Business, School of 
Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg 
62 Papadopoulos, Thomas, The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC (2008). 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 13-103, 2008.  
63 Bainbridge M. Stephen, (2009) Mergers and Acquisitions in Corporate Law, 2nd edition, Concept and Insight 
Series, Foundation Press, pg 379 
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received when the right is exercised equals to two times the exercise price of the 
right and this dilution is the flip-in pill’s deterrent effect.64  
In general, poison pills can also keep the good investors away and this is a serious 
problem. 65 In my scope this is the negative side of this defense tactic, since poison 
pills may be inactive but even a friendly bidder might choose not to bid for the 
company, if there is the chance that the board decides to activate them. 
 
 
GOLDEN PARACHUTE 
 
Golden Parachutes for top executives were created with very specific goals: to 
ensure that shareholders wouldn’t lose out on beneficial M&A deals and to protect 
executives from the fear of being fired, during the corporate takeover way of the 
1980s. By the 1986 about a third of the largest 250 U.S. corporations had adopted a 
Golden Parachute clause, which became an insurance policy for the executives and 
in the same time the executives’ incentives were aligned with the investors’ 
interests. The whole idea was that a good exit package would prevent the executives 
to decline deals that might be prosperous for the company’s shareholders. 66  
Soon, shareholders and investors began to doubt for these benefits and started to 
raise questions as to whether such packages were truly in the interest of the firm. 
Eventually, by the late 1980’s, there were numerous lawsuits against a variety of 
firms over their parachute agreements. Investors and the public still tend to doubt 
for the Golden Parachutes’ defense character and see them as unwarranted and 
disproportionate payoffs to executives who abandon their firms fragmented. 
Nowadays, the business world is left to show if the Golden Parachutes will survive, or 
not. 67 
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In its simple form, a Golden Parachute is a provision in a CEO’s contract which states 
that he or she will get a large bonus if the company is acquired. If this acquirement is 
fulfilled, the managers will be less inclined to block any takeover attempts.68 Except 
for this “bare bones” form of a large bonus, the most elaborate “gold plated” 
parachutes might also include stock grants and options, health insurance, tax 
indemnification and other benefits.69 
 
ACTIVE MEASURES OF A DEFENCE STRATEGY 
 
Proceeding to the active measures of a defence strategy, some of the most 
important are the following: 
 Greenmail Defence 
 White Knight Defence 
 White Squire Defence 
 Pac-man Defence 
 Crown Jewel Defence 
 Capital Structure Changes 
 Litigation 
GREENMAIL DEFENCE 
Greenmail is the defence method which as a transaction is one of the most 
controversial control related phenomenon in corporate finance (Bhagat and Jefferis, 
1992,). Greenmail refers to the tactic through which the target corporation 
repurchases a block of its shares from persons declaring themselves as bidders who 
came to take over the target. Specifically, the incumbent directors authorize 
payment out of corporate funds for the scope of repurchasing the shares which are 
already held by the bidder, ending in this way the takeover attempt. A key term of 
this repurchase agreement is payment of a substantial premium for the bidder’s 
                                                 
68 Grabianowski Ed, (2018) “How hostile takeovers work”, https://money.howstuffworks.com/hostile-
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share, in exchange for the bidder’s agreement not to acquire the firm’s shares again 
or otherwise to seek control of the firm.70  
Financial economists have advanced three views on greenmail based on prevailing 
theories about managers and markets. The first, “management entrenchment view”, 
sees greenmail payments as means by which directors strive to retain control of their 
corporations and at the same time reduce the value of their firms. The second view, 
“shareholder welfare”, argues that even if markets efficiently assimilate public 
information, directors may have nonpublic information according to which, paying 
greenmail is the right move for protecting the shareholders of the target company. 71 
Last, some economists have supported that, even greenmail harms the remaining 
shareholders; the payments may be justified as a method of spreading the costs of 
“policing”72 managers in order to minimize agency costs. Specifically, when the 
“policing” managers identify successfully undervalued companies, they bare all the 
costs for their search but reap only part of the benefit. On the other side, if investors 
mistakenly spot a company undervalued and invest, they bear full the costs of their 
mistake and they cannot spread the loss among the other shareholders. This 
asymmetry makes the process of searching expensive and therefore minimizes the 
policing activity. Seen in this aspect, greenmail payments might be regarded as a 
method for spreading the costs of unsuccessful searches, thereby offsetting the 
benefits enjoyed by free-riders when these searches are successful.73  
In my aspect, the first hypothesis and aspect of Greenmail seems the most logical 
and there should be a legally framework which would protect shareholders, since 
greenmail payments affect their position. Nevertheless, director’s decisions are 
protected by the business judgment rule74, despite the historic purpose of the rule to 
benefit shareholders.75  
                                                 
70 McChesney Fred S.,  (Mar. - Apr., 1993), Transaction Costs and Corporate Greenmail: Theory, Empirics and a 
Mickey Mouse Case Study, Wiley, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Special Issue: 
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71
 The Harvard Law Review Association, (Mar., 1985),  Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-
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73 The Harvard Law Review Association, (Mar., 1985),  Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-
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Goodyear Company and Sir James Goldsmith case  
One famous case of greenmail involved Goodyear Company and Sir James 
Goldsmith. Sir James Goldsmith, in 1986, held an 11.5 % stake in Goodyear Company 
and threatened to take over the company. Goodyear accepted to repurchase from 
Sir James his shares with the restriction that Sir James wouldn’t have the right to 
purchase any stock from the company, for five years. After the transaction, Sir James 
gained about $93 million profit, from the premium that Goodyear paid as a defense 
in his willing to take over the company.76 
 
WHITE KNIGHT DEFENCE 
 
About the second method, White Knight, it has taken its name from the company 
which is more favorable for the targeted company, in comparison with the hostile 
and acquiring one. The term “white knight” typical refers to a potential acquirer 
invited by the target management to top an initial offer which is opposed by the 
management.77 This friendly company takes part as a third party and the 
management of the targeted company peaks this third party in order to protect its 
interests.78 For this scope of protecting its interests, the target management 
cooperates with the white knight and provides him private information about the 
source of gains from the potential takeover.79 
In practice, after the announcement of the initial hostile bid, other raiders also enter 
the battle and they often offer higher bids than the initial. Among those bidders 
there are acquirers that are preferable for the target or even been approached in the 
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first place by him, in order to be saved from the initial hostile bidder. These are the 
“white knights” which are coming as savors of the target company. 80  
A white knight may successfully defend the company but the realistic scope is that 
the target is obliged to choose either to be taken by the hostile bidder or to 
negotiate the acquisition with the white knight, but still be taken. That’s the default 
of this defense strategy but the serious advantage is that through the competition, 
the terms of the bid may be changed and improved. 81 
Nevertheless, the white knight defence tactic has the risk of delivering the control of 
the company to a “savor” and the next move by the white knight cannot be 
predicted from the target company. If the white knight changes its motives and plans 
in the meantime, the savor might even turn to be a “black knight”. Another scenario 
is that there is a chance behind the white knight to be hidden a hostile bidder, who 
uses the white knight as a proxy with the scope of taking the company in its hands. It 
seems that this strategy may even act as a boomerang for the target company. 
 
 
WHITE SQUIRE DEFENCE 
 
A White Squire is the term for a firm that aims to purchase a large block of the target 
company’s block but has no interest in acquiring management control. This third 
friendly party’s willingness focuses only on investing or representation in board of 
the target company. This strategy functions as an obstacle for the hostile company, 
which loses the opportunity to acquire a majority stake of the company’s stock and 
consequently take the control.82  
The white squire defence is similar to white knight defense but the main difference is 
that the white squire is typically not interested in acquiring control of the target 
company. From the target’s aspect, a large amount of the voting stock will be placed 
in the hands of a company or investor who doesn’t intend to sell out to a hostile 
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bidder. In an effort to ensure that the white squire won’t become hostile, the white 
squire may need to agree in advance that it will remain with the target and not 
against it.83 This agreement plays a key role for the successful function of this 
strategy and should be the first step by the target, for the scope of retaining its 
independency in any case. 
 
PAC- MAN DEFENCE 
 
Pac-man defence strategy follows the well-known quote: “Best Defence is a good 
Offence”. This strategy occurs when the target company responds to the hostile bid 
with an offer to buy the hostile company. It is actually an attempt of the target 
company to scare off the wannabe acquirers, by even showing that the target is a 
majority stake and consequently, taking the control from them.84  
For the best analysis of the Pac-Man defence, it is crucial to understand the rules of 
Pac-Man game. In this game, the player (target) is chased by ghosts and these ghosts 
are able to eliminate the target. Instead, if the player eats a power pellet, he gains 
the capability to eliminate the ghosts by simply turning round. Companies use a 
similar approach as a defense to a hostile takeover. The acquiring process begins 
when the acquirer purchases a large-scale of the target company stocks and aims to 
gain the full control of the target company. As a counter- strategy, the target- player 
reacts and purchases the acquirer’s shares and even tries to get the control of the 
attacking company. The most important reason for the target company, to apply 
Pac-Man defence is to avoid the change of leadership and retain the control.85 
However, Pac-Man defence strategy has some important drawbacks. First, it is an 
extremely expensive strategy, which might even increase debts for the target 
company and second, shareholders might be obliged to tolerate losses or lower 
dividends in the upcoming years.86 
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Bendix Corporation VS Martin Marietta case 
A well known case of Pac-man defence case was established among Bendix 
Corporation, an automotive, industrial and aerospace company and Martin Marietta 
Corporation, an aerospace company87. In 1982, Bendix Corporation tried to take over 
Martin Marietta through purchasing a controlling amount of its stocks. Bendix 
Corporation became, on papers, the owner of Martin Marietta. However, Martin 
Marietta’s management decided to sell off its Chemical department, Cement, and 
aluminum division. 88Moreover, even though the company’s earnings were weak, it 
decided to borrow the $1 billion needed to finance the acquisition of the Bendix 
Corporation. By the end of this extreme takeover, Allied Corporation and the United 
Technologies Corporation had both entered the picture.89 Marietta was supported 
by the United Technologies Corporation, which made a counteroffer for Bendix and 
the takeover ended with an ultimate conquest by Allied. The battle ended with 
Bendix becoming a unit of Allied and Bendix shareholders would own stock in Allied. 
Marietta remained independent but due to its huge debt, the company’s balance 
sheet was seriously detrimed. 90 
 
CROWN JEWEL DEFENCE 
 
Crown Jewel Defence is a way for the target company to become less attractive for 
the unfriendly bidder. Through this strategy, the target either sells its most valuable 
assets (crown jewels), to a friendly third party (white knight) or it sells them but 
when the hostile company withdraws its bid, the assets are sold back to the target 
company at a fixed price, agreed in advance. A serious risk of this method is that the 
target company loses its most valuable assets and needs guarantees that it will take 
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them back.91 Therefore, despite the fact that the “crown jewel” defence seems to be 
prima facie effective, it might be proven risky in a way, since the sale of the most 
valuable assets of the company jeopardizes its whole operation.92 
 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHANGES 
 
A target company may protect itself from a hostile takeover, through changes in its 
capital structure. There are four main types four bringing capital structure changes 
and those are the following: 
1) Recapitalization plan 
In general, a recapitalization plan leads the corporation in a totally different financial 
situation than it was before the plan. Important element of the recapitalization plan 
is that it allows the target to act as its own white knight. It usually evolves a large 
payment to the stockholders, which is usually financed through assumption of a big 
debt. The large increase to the company’s debt makes the firm less attractive to 
potential hostile raiders and the recapitalization plan may defeat promptly the 
hostile bidder since the stockholders receive a value for their shares which is 
designed to be superior to the bidder’s offer. 93 
2) Assumption more debt through bonds or a bank loan 
In a few words, the assumption of more debt can be occurred directly, without a 
recapitalization plan. This additional debt can make the target riskier and less 
attractive for a potential bidder. This strategy may act as a scorched earth defense, 
since the additional debt may lead the target to bankruptcy.94  
3) Issuing more shares 
The target company, through issuing new shares, changes its capital structure since 
it retains the same debt level but its equity is increased. By issuing more shares, the 
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target complicates the hostile takeover, since the bidder is obliged to spend much 
more money for acquiring the majority of the stock.95 
4) Buyback 
A buyback is the purchase by the target of its own outstanding shares, which reduces 
the number of the available shares on the open market and in the same time their 
value is highly increased.96 Through this way, the purchased shares are no longer 
available for potential bidders or arbitragers and the target becomes less attractive, 
since its available shares are much more expensive.97 
 
LITIGATION 
 
Last but not least, Litigation is the challenge of the hostile bid by the target 
company. Such challenges cause pressure to the hostile company, which has to be 
prepared for facing a legal injunction or a law suit. During the preparation of the 
bidder, the target has the time to create an additional defence strategy or to press 
the bidder to sweeten the bid in exchange of dropping the litigations. 98  
Litigation helps a target company to refute hostile attacks but is usually not effective 
as a long-term deterrent. There are three arguments that a target company can use 
to legally repel a bidder. First, antitrust, this is the argument according to which if 
the takeover effort is completed, the result combination will de facto violate 
antitrust laws. Second argument is the inadequate disclosure, which means that the 
bidder has not fully disclosed all available information and the final argument is 
fraud, which refers to the claim by the target according to which the attacker 
deliberately misrepresented facts for the scope of depriving stockholders of their 
rights. This last argument is difficult to be presented because it is rarely applicable 
and hard to be proved.  
According to Jarell (1985), approximately one-third of all tender offers are 
challenged by the litigation defense. In a good sight, the real value of a law-suit is its 
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ability to extend the negotiation period before the target’s board response. Most of 
the times, the extension of this negotiation period leads to results such as: the 
improvement of the initial bid and to the higher chance of a successful takeover. 99  
 
To sum up, the defence strategies that are analyzed in this chapter constitute only a 
part of the various strategies that exist and be adopted by companies, for facing 
hostile takeovers. Those referred are the most famous and can be applied either 
separately or combined. In this point it should be emphasized that the enactment of 
those strategies depends every time on the applicable national law. 
 
THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK 
 
The European Union intended to regulate takeovers for the scope of establishing an 
integrated capital market. The initial target was, to set up a single and efficient 
market of securities, which produces higher company value and lower costs of 
capital for European companies and at the same time to present higher yield to the 
shareholders.100  
In a general framework, takeover regulations are designed to maximize shareholder 
value through encouraging beneficial takeovers and in the same time minimizing the 
risks of misbehavior by the directors, the majority of the shareholders and the 
acquirers. This can be achieved with potential rules such as: 1) imposing 
requirements on acquiring companies, target boards or the shareholders 
themselves, 2) establishing fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of all 
shareholders, 3) passing mandatory bids for all shares at the same price and 4) 
forcing board neutrality.101 
In a few lines, the United States and Europe have adopted totally different 
frameworks for the hostile takeovers. For instance, the United States has given 
enough freedom to both acquiring and target companies, which means that the 
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acquirer has the freedom to make an offer for any number of shares and the target 
board of directors may adopt defensive measures against this offer.102  
In the European Union, the legal environment for hostile takeovers differs 
significantly among the Member States.103 The principal source of law on takeovers 
is the EC Takeovers Directive which came into force on May 2004. Specifically, the 
Directive relates to takeover offers for companies whose shares have been admitted 
to trading on a regulated market. Those offers must be public offers to take control 
of a company admitted to a regulated market.104  
Namely, the E.U. Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC) constitutes the legal 
framework which facilitates cross-border takeover bids. Moreover, the Directive is 
based on the EC Treaty chapter of freedom of establishment and it should in 
principle contribute to cross frontier corporate mobility through takeover bids. 
Despite that, due to the various legal and policy approaches of the Member States in 
the field of takeover regulation, the Directive ended up as a compromised version of 
a proposal that the Commission predicted that would be more effective in 
practice.105 
 
THE MANDATORY BID RULE (article 5) 
 
 In comparison with the USA framework, the European Union has restricted 
significantly both the acquirer and the target company, in the takeovers field. First, 
the acquirer is obliged to make a bid for all the outstanding shares and not for any 
number it wants. This is the mandatory bid rule (article 5), which constitutes the first 
pillar of the E.U. Directive and this requirement stands totally different with the 
United States law, which has no requirement to buy unwanted shares.106  The rule of 
mandatory bid is a remarkable achievement of shareholder interests in case of 
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takeovers.107 Under this rule, if an entity acquires control over a company, this entity 
is obliged to make a takeover bid for all the remaining voting securities of this 
company in an equitable price.108 Specifically, article 5 of the E.U. Directive sets that: 
“Member States shall ensure that such a person is required to make a bid as a means 
of protecting the minority shareholders of that company. Such a bid shall be 
addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their 
holdings at the equitable price as defined in paragraph 4.” And “The percentage of 
voting rights which confers control for the purposes of paragraph 1 and the method 
of its calculation shall be determined by the rules of the Member State in which the 
company has its registered office.”109   
The mandatory bid rule may also be seen as a “takeover- hostile “provision since it 
prevents the offeror from making a bid for some of the outstanding shares (partial 
bid) or from trying to buy shares in two stages and in two different prices (two-tier 
bid). As a result, the mandatory bid rule raises the costs for an acquisition since the 
offeror is obliged to make a bid for all the outstanding shares and this may act as a 
deterrent to both friendly and hostile takeovers. 110  
In conclusion, the offeror, due to the mandatory bid rule, may avoid bidding for a 
corporation, since the costs are raised and after the evaluation the whole acquisition 
may be less profitable for the acquirer.  
 
THE BOARD NEUTRALITY OR NON-FRUSTRATION RULE (article 9) 
 
The Directive restrains the directors’ response in case of a bid, with a strict rule on 
neutrality. Specifically, article 9 of the Directive defines that: the management board 
should not make “any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in 
the frustration of the bid”, without the prior authorization by the general meeting of 
shareholders. Except for the exclusion of seeking alternative bids, the target board of 
directors has the competence to choose not to take any defence measures for the 
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scope of frustrating the bid unless these measures are authorized by the 
shareholders. 111 This is because it is considered a fundamental principle that the 
future of the company has to be decided by its owners and not its managers.112 This 
principle of shareholder decision making is directly related to the shareholder 
protection rationale.113 
In practice, if an EU member state or the shareholder’s meeting of the target 
company opted to impose the restrictions on frustrating actions of the target’s 
management board114, which are set in Article 9 of the Directive, the management 
board is permitted to make only specific actions, in the period from the time the 
board receives the announcement concerning the takeover offer until the result of 
the offer is made public or the offer lapses. The permitted actions are the following: 
 Searching for a white knight 
 Actions within the ordinary course of business 
 Actions beyond the ordinary course of business, if the decision is taken 
before the initiating of the time period which is described above and has not 
yet partly or fully implemented 
 Any actions if those are authorized by a shareholder’s meeting taking place 
after the beginning of the “suspicious” time period. For the scope of 
facilitating the prior authorization, the EU member States may adopt rules 
allowing a shareholder’s meeting to be called a short notice (the minimum 
period is two weeks)115 
This strict framework that the Directive provides, leads to a substantial key point for 
taking defensive measures when facing hostile takeovers. The board is obliged to 
inform the shareholders before any movement and that is for sure a restrictive 
factor, especially in cases where the shareholders have actually incited the takeover. 
                                                 
111 Ibid pg 207 
112 Bolkestein Frits, (2002), public speech about the “New proposal on takeover bids”, European Commissioner in 
charge of Internal Market and Taxation, Brussels 
113 Papadopoulos Thomas (2008), Legal Aspects of the Breakthrough Rule of the European Takeover Bid 
Directive, University of Cyprus, Department of Law 
114 According to article 12 (1) of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC), Member States have the option 
not to require companies which have their registered offices within their territories to apply Aricle 9 (2) and (3) 
and/or Article 11. 
115 Cascante Christian and Tyrolt Jochen, European Directive Takeover Guide, Gleiss Lutz, Germany 
-31- 
 
In most of the cases this is practically impossible, since the notice and preparation 
period for a general shareholder’s meeting is too long.116 
 
THE BREAKTHROUGH RULE (article 11) 
 
Article 11 of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC) lays down that: 
“Multiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at the general meeting of 
shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9”. 
This one-share-one-vote system, also known as the breakthrough rule, guarantees 
that shareholders will still have to compete for control in case of an offer, since they 
won’t have the opportunity to take advantage of multiple voting rights and block a 
hostile tender offer. 117  
“Restrictions on voting rights provided for in contractual agreements between the 
Offeree Company and holders of its securities or in contractual agreements between 
holders of the oferee company’s securities entered into after the adoption of this 
Directive, shall not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides 
on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9.” This rule expresses the 
proportionality principle, since according to the rule: contractual and property rights 
which inhibit legitimate bids should be broken through and the shareholders gain 
freedom based on this redistribution of rights118. This is also known as “one share-
one vote” principle and aims at preventing recourse to any pre-bid system of shares, 
which violates this principle, regardless of the class of the shares.119  
Serious deficiency of the “breakthrough” rule is that it only emphasizes to 
restrictions on rights and doesn’t predict something for rights that have been freely 
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negotiated and are enshrined in different classes of shares. This is a point that 
should be predicted and directed, since taking away rights that are freely negotiate 
by the shareholders, without compensation for the loss or without taking the risk of 
undesirable economical consequences, maybe will raise legal issues. 120  
 
THE RECIPROCITY RULE (article 12) 
 
It is crucial that, those provisions regarding board neutrality and the breakthrough 
rule, which are mentioned above, are optional and member states are allowed by 
the Regulation to opt out and not apply them (Art. 12 par 3 of the Directive). Even if 
a Member State decides not to make these rules mandatory, it cannot prevent 
companies from adopting them voluntarily. In this case, the decision for the 
adoption of those rules must be taken in turn by the shareholder’s meeting and can 
be reversed in the same manner. 121 
Moreover, the EU member States may exempt companies which apply Article 9(2) 
and (3) or/and Article 11, from applying them if there is no reciprocity, that is if the 
bidder (or a company controlled directly or indirectly, by the bidder) does not apply 
the relevant Article. There are different aspects of how this reciprocity rule can also 
be applied in case of a non- EU bidder but the Directive does not specify which 
would be the solution in this case. 122  
 
Consequently, irrespective of its strict framework, the Directive retains its flexibility 
by giving the member states the right to make choices according to their policy. 
Conversely, this optional character of the “board neutrality” rule and the 
“breakthrough” rule has been characterized as a serious deficiency of the Directive, 
since it doesn’t assist for the initial scope of creating a unified European system in 
the field of takeover bids. Member States have the opportunity to adopt a different 
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approach and due to this, policy matters arise. In conclusion, for a unified European 
system in the field of takeover bids, changes seem necessary. 
 
PROPOSALS FOR A UNIFIED EUROPEAN SYSTEM 
 
In this part of my paper I will make some proposals that in my aspect would 
contribute for the initial scope of the 2004/25/EC European Directive, namely the 
creation of a unified system among Member States, in the takeovers field. First, the 
Directive, regarding the mandatory bid rule (Article 5), as above mentioned, does not 
specify what share of the capital and voting rights is needed for control and not even 
a method of calculation is predicted. The percentage of voting rights which confers 
control and the method of its calculation are left to be determined by the Member 
State in which the company has its registered office.123 This lack of defining the 
control threshold and price definition, doesn’t contribute to a unified system of 
minority shareholder protection, which is the basic scope of the mandatory bid 
rule.124  
My proposal for a unified minority protection system is to be at least determined a 
range of voting rights that should be used for gaining the control and also a system 
for calculation to be directed. This would lead the Member States to have similar 
regulation regarding the control threshold, without serious deviations. Those 
matters should be directed and a framework should be predicted by the Directive, 
regarding the control threshold and the calculation method adopted, for the scope 
of creating a unified minority shareholder protection scheme, in the European 
Union. 
Moreover, due to the strict board neutrality rule (Article 9) the board of the target 
corporation doesn’t have the power to react directly and effectively against a hostile 
takeover bid, since the decision of taking defence measures against a hostile 
takeover is solely in the hands of the shareholders. Since the shareholder’s meeting 
sometimes cannot be called until after the tender offer has expired, the 
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shareholders are obliged to decide and act individually and not in co- ordination. 125 
A proposal as a solution on this matter, might be to be predicted by the Directive 
that under specific circumstances and if the future of the company is threatened, the 
board has the ability to decide whether to adopt defense measures or not and this 
decision will be examined by the general meeting, afterwards, with serious 
consequences for the management.  
The initial scope of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids 2004/25/EC was the 
harmonization of the different legal systems in Europe, referred to the takeover bids. 
In my aspect, for the fulfil of this aim, the reciprocity rule and  the opt-out possibility 
for Member States, should be restricted, since those possibilities result to many 
different combinations of the legal obligations that the Directive sets. Since board 
neutrality and the breakthrough rule consist the hard core of the Directive, opting 
out of those rules leads to a totally different approach, in the field of the takeovers 
and consequently to different policy principles.  
This is a key point regarding the defence measures, since this optional character of 
the two rules, leads to different approaches regarding the board’s ability to adopt 
defense strategies. Matters arise, since during a hostile takeover among two 
corporations which have their registered offices in different EU countries, national 
law defines the conditions according to which companies which apply Article 9 (2) 
and (3) and/ or Article (11) are exempted from applying them if they became subject 
of an offer launched by a company which does not apply the same Articles as they do 
(Article 12 (3)). In my aspect, these conditions should be predicted from the 
beginning by the Directive, for the scope of harmonizing the takeover bids field, 
since if these conditions are predicted by national law each time, serious 
differentiation will be created among corporations.  
Moreover, as analyzed in this thesis, the proactive measures of a defence strategy 
have a key role, for the defence plan of the acquired corporation. In practice, if the 
national law sets strict conditions for opting out from the breakthrough rule, the 
target company finds itself in a weak position and becomes vulnerable if the bidder 
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doesn’t apply the rule and therefore, the board has not the freedom to use pre bid 
defences, such as poison pills, without the shareholder’s prior authorization. 
Moreover, the Directive should point out what should be the approach of a 
corporation, regarding the reciprocity rule, when the bidder comes from a non- EU 
country. This is a serious matter, since nowadays international business among 
corporations, is an existing and usual phenomenon.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In general, defence strategies against hostile takeovers are the methods which aim 
in protecting the company as well as its shareholders interests. Also, it is a widely 
shared belief that hostile takeovers allow the shareholders to realize the best price 
of their investment. Moreover, it is said that these takeovers are a way of 
transferring control from an inefficient management to an efficient one, and that 
economic efficiency is promoted.126 Someone would ask then what the rationale of 
adopting defence strategies is. 
The answer is that not all the hostile takeovers have a profitable result for the 
company or even an advantageous side. There are cases in which the target 
company needs to be protected and the management board needs to escape from 
the shareholders’ plans. Some hostile takeovers may promote efficiency, some may 
result in a misallocation of economic resources and some may be neutral in terms of 
economic efficiency.127 This differentiation and complexity of every situation needs 
to be confronted with   different defensive methods which constitute various 
strategies. 
In my point of view, defence measures should be taken only after serious evaluation 
and if the hostile takeover threatens the corporation’s economic interests and not 
only the management interests. This decision should be taken through the process of 
a unanimous voting by the shareholders in cooperation with the management board, 
and not without them, since the management has a clear and uninterrupted picture 
of the company’s operation.  
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In the end, defence methods are a matter of policy and the EU Regulation leaves 
enough space for the Member States and indirectly to the interested parties, the 
corporations, to be independent. Specifically, the EU Directive on Takeover Bids 
2004/25/EC, as above mentioned, through the reciprocity rule (Article 12) gives to 
the Member States the discretion to opt- out from the board neutrality rule and the 
breakthrough rule but in the same time the obligation to grant companies which 
have their registered offices in their territory the option of applying these rules.  
In any case, the selection of a defence strategy against a hostile takeover is a crucial 
decision and a matter of policy. The target must be fully prepared for facing 
unfriendly bids and in the same time remain flexible in responding to various 
takeover techniques. For sure, there is no “One size fits all” defence strategy for the 
target to become full-proof against all potential bids. Prerequisite for a well 
structured defence strategy is a review of the takeover environment128, 
circumstances and exogenous factors that may affect the whole acquisition.  
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